Chip Forgery: Exposing Defects in US Defense Supply Chain

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This is because in September last year, the U.S. federal government shut down the electronic device company VisionTech Components, arrested company owner Shannon Wren and administrative manager Stephanie McCloskey, accused them of conspiracy to illegally trade in counterfeit products, imported 3,200 batches of suspected or confirmed counterfeit products. Chip to the United States, and some products sold to the United States Navy, Department of Defense contractors and so on.

Last November, McCloskey pleaded guilty to conspiracy in the District Court of Columbia, the United States, and cooperated with the government to investigate. Wren died of drug overdose in May this year.

Last month, the US government's 78-page sentencing memorandum submitted to the District Court disclosed the details of the McCloskey case, revealing how the small business located in the streets of a quiet residential area in Clearwater, Florida, deceived security. System, putting innocent people in danger and endangering national security for as long as five years.

The US lawyer Ronald Machen wrote in the memo: "According to the types of counterfeit products sold, the industry objects sold, and the military, commercial and industrial applications that these products may use, the defendant McCloskey's actions may be against the U.S. military, military, All industries and consumers such as the government that purchased its counterfeit products caused unpredictable damage and harm.”

According to the memorandum, McCloskey may face imprisonment for four and a half years and pay the trademark owner $600,000 in compensation. The trademark owner specified in the memorandum is a genuine brand manufacturer in the semiconductor industry.

Of the 3,263 batches of chips that VisionTech imported between December 2006 and September 2010, only 35 were identified as containing counterfeit products by US Customs officers at the border and confiscated. The 35 batches of products include 60,000 counterfeit integrated circuit chips. Undetected 3,228 batches of products were sold by VisionTech to more than 1,100 buyers from almost all industries, which flowed into the US electronics supply chain. Many of these buyers are also intermediate suppliers who sell the products to other buyers again. Some counterfeit products were detected during production testing, but thousands of counterfeit products may still be circulating in the supply chain, and may even be used in current equipment.

A group of counterfeit products containing counterfeit parts were sold to BAE Systems of the United Kingdom, which produced the enemy-friendly identification (IFF) system for the Naval Air Operations Center aircraft. BAE purchased VisionTech's 75 products from an intermediary supplier and discovered counterfeit products through third-party testing equipment. If these chips enter the IFF system of the navy ship, the defense function of the vessel may be seriously damaged.

In addition, 1,500 counterfeit Intel flash memory products were sold to Raytheon Missile Systems for high-speed anti-radiation missile (HARM) sighting system (HTS) installed on F-16 fighters to identify and track enemy radar systems. . Raytheon installed the flash memory chips on 28 boards for the HTS module, and these boards immediately failed. By testing nine of the flash memory chips, Raytheon confirmed that these chips are all counterfeit products.